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RECENT DECISIONS
gifts, assigning as the sole reason therefor the widow's absence of
need. The crux of his opinion states that ".... we find it difficult to
believe.., that the payments to petitioner (widow) were based upon
her needs .. .," thereby ignoring the fact that, in adopting the resolu-
tion to make the payments to the widow "The Board had in mind...
the fact that the decedent's death resulted in a curtailment of income
theretofore available to the widow." It is submitted that a corporate
gift can be made to others than the needy or destitute and that the
Tax Court relied on a non-significant fact and circumstance in ar-
riving at its doctrinaire conclusion. Why does the Tax Court refuse
to use previously established tests in post-Duberstein cases if, as the
Third Circuit said in its decision, the Supreme Court "refused the
Commissioner's invitation to spell out a new test for resolving the
question of gift versus income ?"
The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held such payments to
be non-taxable gifts, the Fourth Circuit has held that the Tax Court
erroneously interpreted Duberstein, and the Third Circuit now holds
the fact-finders determination to be controlling. With this diversity
of opinions among the various Circuits, the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to resolve the conflicts. At the session of November 13,
1962, the Supreme Court denied, over the objection of Chief Justice
Warren, five writs of certiorari, including the case under discussion.4 
6
When is a gift a "gift"? Undoubtedly there is an answer.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Narcotics - Criminal conviction for the
status of drug addiction is a cruel and unusual punishment.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417 (1962).
Lawrence Robinson was arrested on a Los Angeles street after dis-
coloration and scar tissue were discovered on the inside of his arms.
Two police officers of long experience in the criminal narcotics prob-
lem made the arrest, and they both testified that Robinson admitted
occasional use of narcotics. One of the officers testified that in his
opinion the scars and marks were caused by narcotic injections.' He
46. Cert. denied in Kuntz's Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 4; Olsen's
Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 5; United States v. Frankel, supra note 6;
Martin v. Commissioner, supra note 33; Smith v. Commissioner, supra note 3. 31
U. S. L. Week 3165.
1. "There are few pathognomic physical characteristics by which the opiate
addict can be recognized as such. Scars and abscesses which result from intra-
venous injections of opiates are among the few helpful overt diagnostic character-
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testified that Robinson was not under the influence of narcotics or
suffering withdrawal symptoms at the time of his arrest. At the
trial the defendant denied ever having used narcotics, as well as the
alleged admission to the officers, and maintained the scars, scabs, and
marks to be from an allergy, this last contention being supported by
two defense witnesses. The trial judge instructed the jury that under
the statute in issue here, 2 the defendant could be convicted if the
jury agreed either that he was an addict, a passive status, or that he
had used narcotics, an overt criminal act. A conviction for use re-
quired proof of the act within the County of Los Angeles, while a
conviction for addiction required only the presence of the defendant
within the County while in the addicted condition. The charge made
a point of distinguishing the alternative clauses of the statute, au-
thorizing conviction for either use' or addiction. The crime of addic-
tion was defined as being "strongly disposed to some taste or practice
or habituated, especially to drugs. In order to inquire as to whether
a person is addicted to the use of narcotics is in effect an inquiry as
to his habits in that regard. To use them often or daily is, according
to the ordinary acceptance of those words, to use them habitually. ' 3
Even though the status of physical craving for the drug is often coin-
cidental with habitual use, it was the physical status and not the act
of use, habitual or otherwise, which California sought to punish by
the statutory clause in question. 4
The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged; the Los Angeles
County Superior Court, the highest California state court reviewing
the misdemeanor, affirmed. The United States Supreme Court, on
istics." Winick, Addiction and Its Treatment, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 9, 13
(1957).
2. "No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use
of narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a person
licensed by the state to prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be the burden
of the defense to show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted
of violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall
be sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in
the county jail .... In no event does the Court have the power to absolve a person
who violates this section from the obligation of spending at least 90 days in con-
finement in the county jail." CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11721.
3. Robinson v. California, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 1430 n. 2 (1962).
4. "That portion of the statute referring to the 'use' of narcotics is based
upon the 'act' of using. That portion of the statute referring to 'addicted to the
use' of narcotics is based upon a condition or status. They are not identical ....
all that the People must show is either that the defendant did use a narcotic in
Los Angeles County, or that while in the City of Los Angeles he was addicted to
the use of narcotics." Robinson v. California, supra note 3 at 1418; c.f. People v.
Ayala, 167 Cal. App. 2d 49, 334 P.2d 61 (1959); People v. Jaurequi, 142 Cal. App.
2d 555, 298 P.2d 896 (1956); People v. Thompson, 144 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 854, 301
P.2d 313 (1956).
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direct appeal, reversed the conviction, ruling that a criminal convic-
tion for addiction was a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Court squarely faced the status crime of addiction and the prob-
lems of narcotic addiction in the United States. Drug addiction and
its effects are regarded by the American mind with horror. The
addict is comparable to the sex maniac in degree of abhorrence.
5
Some authorities contend addiction to be a serious illness with tragic
consequences, but because of the link with the underworld as sup-
plier, it is improperly viewed as criminal rather than medical. 6 Others
maintain it is a criminal problem, involving volition and an evil, anti-
social intent, as well as unlawful acts, since more than one third of the
"cured" addicts request retreatment for re-occurring addiction and a
total of sixty-five percent return to drugs.7 California treated addic-
tion as a criminal threat to society, the State and the individual, and
therefore, punished the status by a criminal statute. The Court here,
however, recognized the medical character of the problem.8
5. Clausen, Social and Psychological Factors in Narcotics Addiction, 22
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 35 (1957).
6. Winick, supra note 1 at 19.
7. Opium Addiction, CYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE, SURGERY, SPECIALTIES, Vol. 9,
pp. 865, 868 (1962).
8. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925). Addiction, from a medical or
physiological point of view, involves three factors. The first is tolerance, or the
addict's requirement of increasing dosage in order to maintain the same physio-
logical satisfaction or relief. The second is the emotional and psychological re-
liance upon the habit-forming drug for a myriad of reasons, rational and irrational.
The third is the physical dependence or need to continue the drug to avoid the
acute, characteristic suffering of the withdrawal or abstinence syndrome. U.N.
Expert Com. or Drugs Liable to Produce Addiction, Report 6-7, World Health
Organization Technical Report Series No. 21 (1950).
It may be withdrawal pain and the fear of this suffering which unites the
physical and psychological aspects of the addicts' craving for the drug, creating the
obscurity as to the genus and cure of the social problem. The suffering is quite
severe. The addict "will be restless for about eight hours after his last 'shot'
and sleeps restlessly in about 12 hours. After twenty-four hours, the patient will
lacrimate, yawn, vomit, sneeze, sweat, develop gooseflesh, (the origin of the
phrase 'cold turkey') pupil dilation, running nose, and have involuntary movements
of his limb muscles; (kicking is the addicts argot for ceasing his 'habit') diarrhea,
aches, some fever, rapid respiration ... may appear as the abstinence syndrome
unfolds. These symptoms are usually at their agonizing peak between forty-eight
and seventy-two hours after the last 'shot' has been taken." Winick, supra note 1
at 10, 11.
Irrespective of the genus of the condition, its effects on the social order are
clear. Youthful addiction is increasing in the United States. Finestone, Narcotics
and Criminality, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 69 (1957). Drug addiction is responsi-
ble for fifty percent of all crimes in urban areas and twenty-five percent of the
nation's reported crime. General addiction is spreading by the personal contact
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California recognized various degrees in the development of the
narcotic drug user. First, the State provided for civil commitment
for a user who "habitually takes or otherwise uses to the extent of
having lost the power of self-control . . . (a) narcotic drug."9 This
power to commit the terminal user was vested in the California
Superior Court.1 0 It would seem that this condition of drug craving
is so severe as to destroy all rational decisions in all areas, but the
demarcation line is unclear between this group of mental incompe-
tents with no self-control and the next serious group of users, the
habitual user who retains his self-control. It is this next group which
California recognized to be beyond civil commitment as incom-
petents, and, therefore, attempted to control and cure by the statute
in issue." California courts "take judicial notice of the fact that
of the addict to society. Illicit Narcotics Traffic, S. Rep. No. 1440, 84th Cong. 2d
Sess. (1956). Crimes of theft and property offenses involving addicts are propor-
tionately higher than the same crimes involving the public at large. For example,
in the total number of crimes reportedly committed by addicts in a large city,
58.8% were crimes of larceny, while larceny made up only 31% of the total city
crime picture. By contrast, 1.6% of addict-crimes were sex offenses, while 11% of
the total crimes were so catalogued. Annual Report 13, Chicago Police Depart-
ment, (1951) cited in Finestone, supra at 71. This criminal effect may be a result
of the blackmarket price of illegal drugs, rather than the intoxicating effect of
the drugs upon inhibitions. Howe, An Alternative Solution to the Narcotics Prob-
lem, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 132, 133 (1957).
Nevertheless, there is no question of the authority of the State or Federal
Government to regulate and control sale, possession, and traffic of narcotic drugs.
Since the turn of the century, major emphasis has been on criminal measures of
increasing severity. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921); 21 U.S.C. 171
et seq.
9. See CAL. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE, § 5350 et seq., which provides
civil commitment through a petition-hearing procedure quite similar to tradi-
tional commitment of mental incompetents. The settled purpose of these enact-
ments is restrictive medical treatment and cure for terminal addiction.
10. People v. Perez, 18 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1961).
11. The overall statutory plan would require a mandatory jail sentence to
cure the addict of his physical dependence and craving, with proper medical care
available, and also to provide for a probationary period to avoid readdiction. Faced
with a definite problem of proof as to overt acts of use and an awareness of the
acute danger of narcotics addiction, the state sought to strike at the addict him-
self by a criminal conviction and mandatory confinement based on the easily
proven physical condition. The avowed purpose of this section was to cure the
addict from his physical condition, but other purposes may underly the Statute.
"The writer discussed the statutory classification of addiction as a crime with
law enforcement officers in most of the states under study. Much opinion was
given freely about the deterrent effect of the statutes, as well as their effective-
ness against the 'contagion' of addiction, their importance as a protection for
society, and their function in persuading addicts to obtain treatment. Such argu-
ments do not hold up under scrutiny, since compulsory civil commitment could ac-
complish all of the same objectives. The real value to law enforcement officials is
that such Statutes provide an effective bargaining point in the search for further
[Vol. I1: p. 257
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the inordinate use of a narcotic drug tends to create an irresistible
craving and forms a habit for its continued use... ,"12 This group,
it is submitted, may still be capable of general rational action in
secondary, worldly areas, but may in fact be incompetent insofar as
the craving for the drug. Still a third group of users recognized by
California are those who "make unlawful use of narcotics (for a
short time) without becoming or being addicted to the use."' 1 3 It
may well be that these users are most susceptible to cure and social
rehabilitation, yet they are the most difficult to bring under the
coercive control of the State. "Addiction" as defined by California
could describe both the extreme "no self-control" group of users and
the intermediate "habit plus worldly self-control" group.
The majority opinion by. Mr. Justice Stewart, and the concurring
opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, indicated that both the habitual user
with no self-control and the habitual user who retains some degree of
control are suffering from an illness. 1 4 The majority compare the
status of addiction with mental illness, leprosy, and venereal dis-
ease,' 5 and held that any criminal conviction for an illness would be a
cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 The con-
stitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment has tradi-
tionally been applied to post-conviction extremes and improprieties,
such as torture, sterilization, chain gangs, or excessive punish-
information. Addicts turn informer much more readily with the threat of imprison-
ment facing them." ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAW, 62 (1962).
12. People v. Jaurequi, supra note 4.
13. People v. Thompson, supra note 4.
14. See CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11721, supra note 2, which indicates
addiction lawfully contracted would not be punishable, but proof of lawfully ac-
quired addiction is a burden upon the accused.
15. "It is unlikely that any state at this moment in history would attempt to
make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be af-
flicted with a venereal disease. A state might determine that the general health
and welfare required that the victims of these and other human afflictions be dealt
with by compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confinement, or sequestra-
tion. But in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a
criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be
an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments." Robinson v. California, supra note 3 at 1420; State of
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144
U.S. 323, 340 (1892); Lynch v. Overholser, 82 S. Ct. 1063 (1962); see also, Suther-
land, Due Process and Cruel Punishment, 64 HARv. L. REv. 271 (1950).
16. State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, supra note 15, assumes
the application of the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment protection
through the Fourteenth Amendment to the States, in often cited dicta. The instant
case is a positive application of the protection in this manner.
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ments.17 But the Court here expanded the cruel and unusual punish-
ment protection, struck down a state statute which imposed a crimi-
nal conviction for a physical status, and called "cruel and unusual"
the conviction itself, exclusive of the resulting fine, imprisonment or
punishment. Cruel and unusual punishment would appear no longer
to be merely a question of the degree of post-conviction punishment,
but rather, by this decision, also a question of the justice of any
conviction of a defendant involved in a particular set of circum-
stances. The mere criminality of a physical status is held to be a
punishment so severe and cruel as to constitutionally bar enforcement
of the statute. This extraordinary application of the constitutional
protection may be, as Mr. Justice White points out in his dissent, a
mere disguise for a holding based on the evasive concept of substan-
tive due process. Since the Court held the physical status to be an
improper and unconstitutional basis for a state criminal statute,
there would appear to be a substantive restriction on the power of the
states to define crime, other than the areas preempted by Federal
Statute.18 It appears that the Court is reluctant to affirmatively de-
fine the extraordinary limitation which must have its roots in natural
law and justice, and instead attempts to define and justify its holding
in terms of "cruel and unusual punishment." Mr. Justice Douglas
concludes, ".... the principle that would deny power to exact capital
punishment for a petty crime would also deny power to punish a
person by fine or imprisonment for being sick .... We would forget
the teachings of the Eighth Amendment if we allow a sickness to be
made a crime and permitted sick people to be punished for being
sick. This age of enlightenment cannot tolerate such barbarous
action." 19
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, indicated that the statute as inter-
preted by the trial court 2 0 authorized punishment for a compelling
propensity to use narcotics, as an habitual desire, devoid of proof as
to an overt act of use within the jurisdiction of the court. This in
effect is a criminal punishment for a bare desire to do a criminal act.
While the desire may be reprehensible, he argued that it would be
arbitrary and beyond the power of the state to punish mere desire.
Thus Justice Harlan, while reluctant to extend the "cruel and un-
usual punishment" protection to bar the statute, clearly indicated a
17. In Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227, 237 (1940); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 167-168 (1890); O'Neil v. Vermont,
supra note 15 at 331; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1879). See generally,
note, 4 VAN. L. REv. 680, 687 (1951).
18. Contra, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
19. Robinson v. California, supra note 3 at 1425, 1426.
20. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S.
312 (1926); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948).
[Vol. 1 : p. 257
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substantive limitation on the state's power to define and establish
crime. Traditional criminal theory would be in accord with the
criminal punishment of use, possession, and traffic, if legislatively
found to be against the social welfare, but could not support the
criminality and punishment of any desire, no matter how anti-social,
utterly devoid of any overt act.
Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, contended that when the provision is
placed in perspective with the problem and overall legislative intent,
it is not a violation of due process or a cruel and unusual punishment.
The provision is a part of a comprehensive program to control nar-
cotic addiction based on a plan of prevention and cure; the plan
itself was founded on extensive scientific investigation and research.
California sought to limit use, sale, possession, traffic, and also to
punish the status of addiction, a threat to the state. 2 1 While the
involuntary, incompetent addict is treated under the civil commit-
ment provision, the criminal section applies to the less seriously
affected addict who retains some degree of self-control over his
actions. Its overriding purpose is to cure the less seriously addicted
by preventing the further use of the drug by a mandatory sentence. 2 2
Justice Clark argued that use, possession and traffic are not harmful
in themselves, yet the state may punish them to deter their anti-
social effect. Volitional addiction poses a similar antisocial threat
and California should not be powerless to deter it by criminal convic-
tion. 2 3 The statute, he urged, when viewed in its overall perspective
is one of treatment and not of "criminal" punishment, irrespective of
its "criminal" label, and as such, it is clearly within the power of
the state. Finally, ninety days is not unreasonable or cruel when ap-
plied to a person who voluntarily poses a serious threat to the State.
Mr. Justice White in a separate dissent viewed the statute as pun-
ishing addiction equated with habitual use. 2 4 To find the defendant
guilty under the statute in issue, he argued, the jury must have
believed that the defendant had frequently used narcotics in the re-
cent past, within the jurisdiction. 2 5 Addiction requires habitual use,
21. "The rehabilitation of narcotic addicts and the prevention of continued
addiction to narcotics is a matter of statewide concern." CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY
CODE, § 11728.
22. Robinson v. California, supra note 3 at 1428.
23. The properly prohibited aspects of the problems are all overt acts against
the established law of the forum, while addiction, it is submitted, is a mere physical
status on one hand or a craving or desire on the other.
24. See charge of the Court quoted in the body of the comment, at note 3,
supra.
25. The defendant lived and worked in Los Angeles, and there was testimony
that he had admitted using narcotics in the jurisdiction. Robinson v. California,
supra note 3 at 1430, n. 3.
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and upon a verdict of guilty, the jury in effect indicated the defendant
to be guilty of habitual use, causing a physical status or illness. Prior
California venue laws required trial for use to be in the county of the
locus of the act; the statute here merely removed this bar and allowed
convictions for habitual use where there was no precise location
of use. 2 6 Under Mr. Justice White's view, it is submitted, the statute
would merely punish use inferred from the status of addiction under
a liberalized venue requirement. It would appear, however, that the
statute as written and interpreted by California was intended to
punish more than use, and that addiction, as treated by the statute,
was to be more than a mere basis for inferential proof of unlawful
use.
In summary, this decision seems to have firmly barred conviction for
the status of narcotic addiction, in California and elsewhere. 2 7 It
recognizes the seriousness of the social problem and the doubt as to
the effective combative methods. It reaffirms the obvious power of
government to punish possession, traffic, and use, whether occasional
or habitual. 2 8 It recognizes civil commitment for the addict incom-
petent to live in society. 2 9 But it holds firmly that proof of the
physical status of narcotic addiction cannot be the basis of criminal
26. Robinson v. California, id. at 1432.
27. In addition to California, four other states punish addiction as a status or
condition, devoid of use. They are: Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. 36-1062; Con-
necticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 19-246; Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. § 475.625; Utah,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-13a-1 to 48, § 76-42-9, § 76-61-1.
28. Seven states define an addict as an habitual user, then punish him crim-
inally as an habitual user. They are: Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. 38 § 192.28-3, as
amended, (arm marks from injections prima facie evidence of repeated unlawful
use of drugs); Indiana, IND. STAT. ANN. §10-3538a (forbids an addict from going
to a public place or on a public street, unless under the care of a licensed physician,
also employs arm marks and urinalysis as evidence of "habitual use"); Louisiana,
LA. REV. STAT. § 40:961-984 (unlawful to become an addict, defined as an habitual
user); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218.010 to 250; New Jersey, N.J.S.A.
§ 2A: 170-8, 169-4, 170-8 (requires registration of addicts and declares a user as
a disorderly person); Missouri, MO. REV. STAT. § 195.010-210, § 202.360, § 560.161;
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 69.32.01 to 960, § 69.33.220, § 9.91.030.
29. Most states have some type of commitment provision for addicts who
have reached mental incompetence. The following states have provided for specific
commitment of addicts: Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-5-5; Delaware, DEL.
CODE ANN. 16 § 4714; Florida, FLA. STAT. § 398.01 to § 398.24; Hawaii, HAWAII
REV. LAWS 52-51 to 52-61; Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 335.5-335.78, 335.151-
157, § 335.201-215, § 335.301; Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.360; Nevada, NEV.
REV. STAT. § 28-451 to 472; New Mexico, N. M. STAT. ANN. 54-7-51; Rhode Island,
R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-28-1 to § 21-28-66; Washington, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 69.32.010 to 960, § 69-33.220, § 9.91.03; Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 161.01 to 161.28;
California, CAL. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE, § 5355.
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conviction and confinement. 30 The question of whether this holding
was based on an underlying, extraordinary substantive limitation on
the state's power to define crime is a problem requiring further
clarification by the court. In any event it is clear that there is more
underlying this decision than traditional "cruel and unusual punish-
ment." Justice Harlan and Justice White both indicate this expressly,
and the extraordinary extension of the "cruel and unusual" doctrine
to apply to the instant fact situation demands an exacting dissection
of its foundation and a careful prognosis of future effect. The tradi-
tional overt acts of use, possession, sale and purchase of narcotics,
despite detection and proof difficulties, remain the only proper crim-
inal fields of battle upon which the states may assault the narcotic
problem.*
MUNICIPAL BORROWING - Pennsylvania Constitution - Legislative
definition of assessed valuation to mean market value declared un-
constitutional.
Breslow v. Baldwin Township School District, 408 Pa. 121, 182
A.2d 501 (1962)
On January 10, 1962, the Board of Directors of Baldwin Township
School District, without the consent of the electorate, adopted a reso-
lution authorizing the issue and sale of $2,500,000 worth of general
obligation bonds as permitted by Section 6203 of the Municipal Bor-
30. The District of Columbia, D. C. CODE ANN. 33-416a, provides a criminal
punishment for an addict who is a vagrant. If there is suff1cient evidence and
power to convict the defendant for vagrancy, there would be no apparent need for
the "vagrancy and addiction" statute. If the evidence would be insufficient to con-
vict the addict of vagrancy, this case would apparently bar any conviction for
vagrancy plus addiction. Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. 63.470.11-12, provides a
criminal conviction for any person who has so lost control as to abuse the use of a
drug. Conviction here would be proper, according to this decision, only if it was
the abuse of use of a drug which was punished, and not the status itself-loss of
control- which was criminal.
* EDITOR'S NOTE: A petition for rehearing made by the State of California
was denied by the Court in an opinion handed down November 13, 1962, reported
at 83 S. Ct. 202. The state sought to have the Court vacate as a moot question the
judgment reversing Robinson's conviction, on the ground that the defendant
had died on August 5, 1961, some 10 days prior to the filing of his jurisdictional
statement. The ruling decision, discussed above, was handed down on June 25,
1962, the Court having no notice of the defendant's demise. Nevertheless, the
petition for rehearing was denied, Justice Clark, Justice Harlan, and Justice
Stewart dissenting.
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